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ESSAY
Telecommunications Access in the
Age of Electronic Commerce: Toward
a Third-Generation Universal Service
Policy
Milton Mueller

I.

INTRODUCTION

For the past three decades, universal service policy has centered on the
humble copper wire, or more abstractly, on the idea of a line into the home.
Gigantic cables connected cities and continents; from there, rivulets of
twisted copper wires wended their way through millions of streets to users.
The basic social policy questions were: Is the wire there or not? What must
be done to get it there? Can people afford to pay for it?
The United States and many other countries are in the midst of
remaking their universal service policies.1 Unfortunately, these exercises in
policy adjustment have not been very creative. Like generals preparing to
fight the last war, regulators in the United States and elsewhere are working
hard to update and rationalize the cross-subsidies of the old monopoly
system to make them compatible with competition.2

1. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 contains a new section devoted to universal
service: Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 254, 110 Stat. 133, 253-54 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 254). See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and OrderEstablishing a Joint Board, 61 Fed. Reg. 10,449 (1996); Federal
Communications Commission, Recommended Decision on UniversalService, 61 Fed. Reg.
63,778, also available in (last modified Nov. 21, 1996) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
CommonCarrier/Reports/decision.html>.
2. "For decades, we [regulators] have all ordered [higher] prices on toll, business,
vertical services, and certain urban residential dialtone to help pay for residential service in
less dense, higher cost areas. Competition blunts and breaks these tools. Without complete
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A conception of universal service that centers on the wire into the
home, however, is no longer meaningful. In all but a tiny handful of remote
locations, universal communications access has little to do with the presence
or absence of physical facilities. The infrastructures of telecommunication
are proliferating in number and expanding in capacity at an unprecedented
rate. Furthermore, a growing body of research suggests that the rental price
of the access line is not the decisive factor affecting the affordability of
service. The notion that universal service hinges on regulatory subsidies to
facility construction or to access line rentals seems oddly out of touch with
contemporary conditions.
The most important universal service issue now and for the foreseeable
future concerns how people will access and use the infrastructures that
surround them. Gaining the ability to access communications facilities when
and where they are needed requires an account relationship between the
supplier and the user. The account relationship, I submit, should be the
focal point of universal service policy today. As is often the case in the
world of digital networks, the most important issues revolve around
software, not hardware: access hinges on processes such as account
verification, credit authorizations, billing, and collection. The most
appropriate symbol of universal service is not the copper wire but the card:
the credit card, the debit card, the SIM card (or "smart card"). Universal
service issues should be viewed within the context of the rise of electronic
commerce. This Essay explores some of the issues raised by the convergence of card-based commerce and telecommunications access.
II. PRIOR GENERATIONS OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE POLICY
By way of background, it may be useful to look at universal service
policy historically, as a succession of different policy generations. The
notion of a "policy generation" is adapted from the vocabulary of
communication engineers, who like to refer to generations of technology
succeeding each other.' Universal service policy has already gone through
two distinct generations. Each was a response to a specific set of problems
posed by that period's economic, political, and technological conditions. My

reform of our universal service system, competition will eventually put universal service into
a death spiral, as high volume customers move to new entrants to avoid subsidy payments."
Reed Hundt, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, to the Communications
Committee, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (July 23, 1996)
(visited Feb. 5, 1997) <http://www.fcc.gov/speeches/Hundt/spreh631.txt>.
3. I also find the biological overtones of the term congenial. Policies, like technological
systems, have ancestors and progeny, and rise and fall over time based on their suitability
to a particular technological, political, and economic environment.
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argument is that it is time to formulate a new, third-generation policy.
A.

FIRST GENERATION (1907-1965)

The first-generation universal service policy was a response to the
problem of competing telephone systems in the early 1900s.4 Telephone
competition posed a "universal service" problem because the competing
exchanges refused to interconnect with each other. Interconnection of
competing networks was not perceived as a viable option at that time. The
telephone companies, and most legislators and regulators, agreed that
intercommunication among all telephone users required a single franchised
telephone system in each community. "Universal service" at this time was
about connectivity-it meant that all telephone subscribers should be able
to talk to each other. Its chief expression in federal law was the 1921
Willis-Graham Act,5 which exempted telephone companies from antitrust
laws so they could merge into a single system. The main concern of the
policy was not the level of household telephone penetration, but the user
fragmentation created by competing systems. From about 1915 to 1925,
competing local exchanges were merged into territorial monopolies and
linked into a nationwide system. Regulation was used as a substitute for the
price and service incentives of competition. At this stage, utility regulation
was not linked to a policy of promoting household telephone penetration,
nor was the term universal service linked to rural-area subsidies.
B.

SECOND GENERATION (1965-PREsENT)

The second generation of universal service policy emerged out of the
way regulators handled the revenue flows and cost accounting relationship
between local and long-distance service and the state and interstate
jurisdictions. After World War II, as the costs of long-distance service
dropped and the costs of local service increased, regulators and politicians
preferred to hold down local rates using the surplus generated by longdistance. There was no legislative basis for this policy; it was a response to
political pressures placed on regulators.6 When these cross-subsidies were
threatened by the rise of long-distance competition in the 1970s, telephone
companies tried to defend their monopoly privileges by claiming that crosssubsidies were essential to the preservation of widespread household

4. See MILTON MUELLER, UNIVERSAL SERVICE: INTERCONNECTION, COMPETITION, AND
MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM (1997).

5. Transportation Act of 1920 (Willis-Graham Act), Pub. L. No. 15, ch. 20, 42 Stat.
27 (1921) (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections).
6. PETER TEMIN & LouIs GALAMBOS, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM 24-25 (1987).
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telephone penetration. The term "universal service" was dusted off and
given a new meaning; a telephone in every home. Universal service policy
came to mean manipulation of rates by regulators to deliver access subsidies
to rural and household users at the expense of urban and business users.
The second-generation policy assumed that the monthly line rental was
the key to the affordability of telephone service. Consequently, the policy
was willing to tax usage to subsidize access. It assumed that a significant
number of users could not afford to pay the real cost of the monthly line
rental, especially in rural, high-cost areas. Finally, it assumed that there is
only one form of telecommunications access that really counts, namely
telephone service. The telephone system was treated as an essential facility,
like electric power and water supply.
While the second-generation policy was never part of the Communications Act of 1934, 7 it clearly was the inspiration for section 254 of the
1996 Telecommunications Act.8 The new Act attempts to codify the
second-generation concept of universal service while reconciling monopolyera cross-subsidies with the demands of a competitive marketplace. Thus,
the law puts the words "universal service" into the Communications Act for
the first time, and codifies the second-generation idea that regulators must
make telecommunications access "affordable." It also writes into law the
geographic rate-averaging of the old system, and even extends the idea of
geographic nondiscrimination further to include the deployment of advanced
services. Although it calls for a new, continuously updated definition of
universal service, the 1996 law's approach to universal access really is
based on old, second-generation assumptions. Instead of recognizing the
growing diversity of networks and access methods, it assumes that a digital
broadband network will, like the telephone system of the past, reach into
every home with a uniform grade of service, allowing the population to be
neatly categorized into those who can afford this level of service and those
who cannot.

C. THIRD-GENERATION REALITIES
An analysis of the characteristics of the new telecommunications
environment raises serious questions about the applicability of the secondgeneration policy. First, it is evident that there will be a growing number
of telecommunications access technologies and systems. This is true even
if one excludes one-way entertainment services from consideration and

7. See MUELLER, supra note 4, ch. 12.
8. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Sec. 151, 254, 110 Stat. 56
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254).
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restricts the scope of universal service policy to two-way, interactive
services. The traditional fixed telephone network, cable TV systems, cellular
and PCS voice systems, and a wide variety of wireless data systems are all
actual or potential providers of basic communications access. Internet
service is yet another important form of telecommunications access.
Although it is delivered to end users via telephone lines it does represent
a distinct service. Let us not forget access to banks and other financial
institutions via cards and networks. In the age of digital money, this type
of telecommunications access is as important as any voice channel.
Telecommunications access is no longer one simple, homogeneous
thing. It is becoming increasingly specialized and heterogeneous. Those who
predicted that electronic communications would all "converge" into a single,
broadband, integrated network are plainly wrong. Access is diverging into
many different forms. Most people will consume more than one of these
access technologies. They may have a fixed voice service at home, but they
will also have some kind of data communication account, and/or a pager
account, a telephone credit or debit card, an ATM card, and some kind of
entertainment-oriented video account or subscription. Users will want to be
able to move in and out of different types of networks depending on which
one is most appropriate to their needs at a given time.
Second, nearly all of these different network infrastructures will be
competitive; that is, they will have multiple suppliers. Thus, in addition to
consuming a variety of specialized types of telecommunications access,
users will expect to be able to move more or less easily between competing
networks of the same type.
Within this environment of heterogeneous and competing networks,
the most important issues are:
The account relationship.
What kind of an account relationship exists between the users and a given
supplier? The infrastructure(s) will be there. The question is whether a
particular user can gain authorization to use it. Is it a credit account or a
debit account? Under what circumstances is the supplier willing to extend
a line of credit to the user? Upon what criteria will users be denied access
or usage rights?
1.

2.

Usage-relatedcosts.

How much does it cost to use the network at a given time and place? The
literature on telephone disconnection makes it clear that the build-up of
usage charges over time, not the monthly line rental, is the biggest
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economic factor driving the economically marginal off the network.' A
related issue is the extent to which usage charges and fees capitalize on the
ignorance of users as they move from network to network and supplier to
supplier. The abuse of payphone-based, long-distance charges by alternative
operator services is a well known example of this type of problem.
3.

Account portability.

How portable is the account relationship across different infrastructures and
suppliers? Are users "locked in" to a supplier by technical incompatibility,
communication protocols, proprietary software standards, internetwork fees,
or plain old refusals to deal? Internetwork fees in ATM card networks exact
a toll on portability by charging users one dollar or more for every
transaction outside the issuing bank's ATM network. To what extent do
network usage charges and/or fees discriminate against people who cross
network boundaries, and to what extent are these fees justified by costs or
the competitive requirements of product differentiation?
Thus, if we picture a low-income, inner-city resident in the near future
(or even in the present) we are likely to see someone surrounded by hightech infrastructures-wireless and wired; data, voice, and video; local and
national. But as this person moves among the ATM machines, computer
terminals, mobile base stations, telephone lines, and cables of the city, the
only portal into this world she is likely to find is the gritty, neighborhood
coin-operated payphone. The great obsession of the second-generation
policy, the cost of the monthly line rental into the home, is probably the
least significant economic factor affecting access and usage in this
environment. The FCC's current belief that such people will be helped by
expanding the definition of universal service and subsidizing suppliers to
make access more affordable is just as misguided. For the poor, the main
barriers are the unrecoverable fixed costs of establishing the account
relationship (deposits, installation fees), the cost of usage, and the risk of
losing control over the level of usage, which can lead to a poor credit
record and disruption or destruction of the account relationship. Aside from
that, most people spend a large portion of their waking hours outside of the

9. Field Research Corporation, AFFORDABILITY OF TELEPHONE SERVICE - A SURVEY
OF CUSTOMERS AND NON-CUSTOMERS (1993); Milton Mueller & Jorge Reina Schement,
UniversalServicefrom the Bottom Up: A Profile of TelecommunicationsAccess in Camden,

New Jersey, 12 THE INFO. Soc. 3 (1996); J.B. HORRIGAN & L.

RHODES, THE EVOLUTION

OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN TEXAS (1995); CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC TELEPHONE
COMPANY, THE CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC TELEPHONE COMPANY'S SUBMISSION OF
TELEPHONE PENETRATION STUDIES, Formal Case No. 850, District of Columbia Utilities

Commission (Oct. 4, 1993).
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home. The poor as well as the rich are, of necessity, in a distributed
economy which is increasingly mobile. A universal service policy which
privileges access at home to the exclusion of other places is hardly worthy
of that grand term, universal.
From the supply side, however, there are important reasons why
networks might want to create barriers to access and usage: to protect
themselves from fraud, to reduce the risk of uncollectible accounts, to gain
a competitive advantage, or to differentiate their service in the market.
Thus, any third-generation policy has some important trade-offs to consider.
In this context, the second-generation idea of a common utility with
a universal service obligation fulfilled by means of a fixed infrastructure
and financed through intra-industry cross-subsidies to access rentals is
simply irrelevant. We need a new generation of policy that focuses on the
account relationship.
Ill. THE PHENOMENON OF CARD-BASED ACCESS
The market is already moving into the third generation. In order to
prepare the reader for a discussion of the impact of cards on the economics
of telecommunications access and universal service, this section describes
the growth of card-based access in telecommunications and in the
surrounding society.
A.

DEBIT CARDS

The prepaid telephone card is a market development which has more
profound universal service implications than the entire 1996 Telecommunications Act. Prepaid phone cards are usually debit cards; i.e., users pay in
advance for the right to make toll or local telephone calls and the payment
is recorded in an account which is debited as usage occurs. (Some cards are
"stored value" cards, wherein the money value is stored directly on the chip
or magnetic media of the card itself.) Cards are sold in denominations of $3
to $100 at convenience stores, copy centers, gas stations, drug stores, truck
stops, and newsstands. In its most common form, users receive a card with
an 800 number and an authorization code printed on it. Card owners dial
the toll-free number to reach a switch operated by the card issuer, then
punch in their authorization code. After a recorded message tells them the
value remaining on the card, they dial the number they want to call. Cards
have an expiration date, after which they are invalid.
There is a great deal of variation in the technology. Sometimes the
card can be "recharged" over the telephone using a credit card. Others have
to be "recharged" by the retailer, while others are disposable. Some cards
simply have the authorization code printed on it, which allows anyone who
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breaks into the packaging and records the code to illegally use the account
after the card is purchased. Others cover the authorization code with a
"scratch-off" coating. More sophisticated "smart cards" can eliminate the
need for PIN authorization codes but require special terminals with both
magnetic and chip-reading capabilities.
Telephone debit cards got their start in the United States as a
promotional item. Advertisers would issue debit cards with free long
distance time and printed advertising on the front of the card. A few years
ago promotions accounted for 85 percent of the United States market and
retail sales only 5 percent. By the middle of 1996, however, retail sales of
telecards accounted for 50 percent of the market and its proportion was still
growing. The total prepaid phone card market (including the value of
marketing, production, and related transactions) was expected to exceed one
billion dollars in 1996. Retail sales account for about $400 million of this.
One of the key market segments driving this growth was inner city
immigrant populations who wanted to make international calls to relatives.
This is also one of the population segments with the lowest telephone
penetration rates.
The usage charges for debit cards are cheaper than collect calls,
international credit-card calls, and coin calls. But they are more expensive
than direct dialing from a home account. The reason is that debit card
providers buy 800 number service and wholesale long distance service from
carriers and resell it at a markup. They must pay for two calls: the incoming
800 call and the outgoing long-distance call.' ° There is some evidence that
competition is pushing down prices. In mid-1996, Sprint's fifty cent per
minute rate was one of the lower offerings. By September, however, Pac
Bell was advertising a forty cent per minute fiat rate for local, local toll,
and domestic long-distance, and six-second billing increments. Some
providers advertise rates as low as twenty-five cents per minute." The
rapid expansion of the debit card market has created problems as well as
benefits. In at least six major cases, phone card operators have sold cards
to consumers without fulfilling their service obligations.' 2 After buying

10. A five-minute call from New York to Los Angeles using Sprint costs $1.25 for
direct dial, $2.50 for a prepaid card, $3.50 for a collect call, $3.90 for a coin call, and $5.12
for an operator-assisted call. Steven A. Rosenbush, Telecard Tussle, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), June 9, 1996, at 1, available in Westlaw 1996 WL 7940603.
11. See Flex Net Anywhere Prepaid Calling Cards, AMCI Anywhere Telecard (visited
Feb. 5, 1997) <http://www.phonecard.com/flexnet.html>.
12. The companies are USA Calling (Atlanta), Canada Calling (Canada), TLC (New
York), TeleCuba (Miami), Trans-Asian Communications (catering to Indian and Pakistani
users in Manhattan), and Conetco (catering to Chinese immigrants in New York city). See
If Your Phone Card Disconnects, CONSUMER REP., Sept 1996, at 6; Douglas Feiden,
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cards, customers discovered that the 800 access line was always busy or had
been disconnected, and that the customer-service lines were unreachable. In
most of these cases phone cards were rendered inoperable by the underlying
long-distance carrier because the card issuers were not current in paying
their bills for usage. The victims were mostly immigrants, minorities, and
the inner-city poor who buy phone cards at delis, bodegas, newsstands, and
check-cashing places. When the cards turn out to be worthless the buyers
are usually unable to have their money refunded by these small retailers.
In fact, what may appear to be a simple shift from a line of credit to
prepayment actually involves a complex chain of transactions. Disconnection of phone cards, like disconnection of local residential phone lines, most
often occurs because users, in this case the card-issuing company, fail to
keep current in paying their bills for usage. Long-distance carriers typically
require large deposits from the intermediary card issuers to protect
themselves from losses. Thus, while debit cards allow the final consumer
to avoid the up front costs and deposits associated with establishing an
account relationship, they merely shift this burden to an intermediary. When
this intermediary's service is suspended, end users risk losing their
prepayment.
Various remedies are being explored. In February 1996, the Florida
Public Service Commission (Florida PSC) opened Docket No. 960254-TL
to study what should be the proper form of consumer protection regulation
for prepaid telephone cards. 3 A workshop with the Florida PSC, the
Florida Attorney General's Office, the United States Telecard Association,
and numerous companies who market prepaid telephone cards was held
June 3, 1996.14 The International Telecard Association is exploring the
possibility of creating an official seal and a guarantee for member
organizations. A more technically oriented fix is proposed by Comtel Debit
Technologies, whose daily metered billing service automatically transfers
funds between the banks of the carrier and the card-issuing company based
on metering of actual phone card usage.' s

PhoneCard Consumer Fraud, PCM Report On-line (visited Feb. 5, 1997) <http://
www.pcmreport.com/curmews/>.
13. See Jim Strong, Regulatory Analyst, Florida Public Service Commission, Regulation
of Prepaid Telephone Cards in Florida, PCM Report On-Line (visited Feb. 5, 1997)
<http://www.pemreport.com/curmews/curr064.htm>.
14. Id.
15. Comtel Launches Daily Metered Billing Service (visited Feb. 5, 1997) <http://
www.comtel-debit-tech.com/press/press03.html>.
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CARD-BASED ACCESS IN WIRELESS SERVICES

The importance of credit risk and account relationships in mediating
access and usage is even more evident in newer services such as cellular
telephony. Because of the higher prices for usage, cellular providers use
credit bureaus to verify the credit records of applicants for service.
According to one cellular provider, approximately 25 to 30 percent of all
applicants do not meet the criteria for establishing service and must be
asked for a cash deposit. If the deposit is set at $250, only about 8 percent
of the disqualified group can be activated for service. If the deposit
requirement is in excess of $250, only 2 percent of the disqualified group
can be activated. 16 At any given time, about 15 percent of all cellular
customers are delinquent. Whenever cellular companies loosen up their
activation criteria that number quickly rises. 7 The cellular industry's
exposure to fraudulent usage stemming from stolen account numbers and
authorization codes runs into billions of dollars each year.
Management of the account relationship is thus one of the most critical
factors affecting the viability of mobile telecommunications service
providers. Credit risk severely limits the size of their eligible customer pool
and imposes huge costs in the form of customer screening, billing,
collection, and fraud expenses. Consequently, cellular companies are
exploring new payment systems based on smart cards, debit cards, and
credit cards. This change is facilitated by the industry's migration to digital
technology.
A company called Prime International Products/PICK Communications, for example, is already providing prepaid cellular telephone time and
leased cellular telephone terminals for a single up front fee. The company's
service allows users to avoid monthly access rentals and the credit
authorization process now required to obtain a cellular telephone. PCT has
in mind a high-end market niche of business travellers who need a cellular
phone for a week or a month. As wireless service expands, however, such
arrangements may be expanded to a mass market just as telephone debit
cards have been.
The European digital cellular technology known as GSM has
employed smart cards (known as SIM cards) since 1991. SIM cards are
credit-card-sized devices which can be inserted into any compatible cellular

16. Narisa Chu, Presentation at Rutgers University (Nov. 19, 1996).
17. The cellular company Metro 2000 offered a promotion called "Cellphone in a box"
at retail outlets such as K-Mart during the holiday gift season. The delinquency percentage
increased to 20%. Id.
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terminal. They contain the personal account information and user data
required to authorize and bill for usage. The SIM card arrangement is more
like a portable telephone account, however, and as such is more akin to a
charge card relationship than a debit card. Smart-card trials based on the
American digital cellular standard known as CDMA are taking place in
Korea. In short, the idea of a card that is detachable from the actual
telephone set or line is well on its way to becoming a common feature of
telecommunications access in mobile telecommunications.
C.

CREDIT AND CHARGE CARDS

The traditional account relationship between users and local and longdistance carriers is structurally similar to a charge card such as the
American Express card. Users with a valid account have an open line of
"credit" but must pay off all outstanding charges within thirty days of
receiving the monthly bill. Telephone calling cards generally mirror this
account relationship. Calling cards simply enhance telecommunications
access by making it possible for users to be billed for calls made from
telephones in locations other than that of the home account. Like the home
account itself, the calling card is an open line of credit with no specific
credit limit and no revolving interest charges. Although customers paid high
premiums for the convenience of using telephone calling cards, the number
of cards in circulation doubled from 1986 to 1991, to 100 million.' Until
the rise of the debit card, the only alternatives to calling cards were collect
calls, or carrying around lots and lots of coins.
Recognizing the tacit convergence of credit card and telecommunications usage markets, AT&T issued its Universal Card in 1990. The
Universal Card combined calling card features with the characteristics of a
revolving credit card account. Banks were initially distressed by the
initiative; however, the telephone giant's foray into credit card markets
proved less significant than the banks' movement into telecommunications.
Visa, Mastercard, and American Express all offer calling card features on
their charge and bank cards.
A war of words between AT&T and the local exchange carriers
(LECs) during the summer of 1996 provides interesting insights into the
characteristics of competition in the age of card-based access. Agreements
between AT&T and the LECs allowed AT&T calling card holders to make
card calls simply by dialing "0" and the phone number. In mid-1996 AT&T
began to nullify those agreements, requiring customers to dial 1-800-CALL-

18. Wanda Cantrell, The Coming Free-for-allin CallingCards, CREDIT CARD MGMT.,
Sept. 1991, at 68, 68-72.
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ATT to complete card calls. Customers who were not aware of this change
suddenly found that their standard practice of dialing 0 and the number no
longer worked. The LECs fielded many complaints from these customers.
A United States Telephone Association spokesman charged that "AT&T is
forcing its calling card customers-a child calling home after school or a
professional at a meeting calling the office for messages--to use the long
distance company's network for a local or toll call and then turning around
and billing that customer with a surcharge that in some markets can be 80
cents or more over and above the basic rate per minute."'19 AT&T's stated
motive in terminating the mutual card holding agreements was to make sure
that its customers were actually being connected to AT&T's long-distance
network when they used the AT&T card. AT&T officials claimed that some
LECs were exploiting the "dial 0" access to sell their own network services
to AT&T card customers. To put it in favorable terms, AT&T wanted to
maintain brand identity and guarantee a certain quality and type of service.
To put it in unfavorable terms, AT&T wanted to exploit the link between
the account relationship and telecommunications access to lock its
customers into its own network and exact premium charges.
D.

BROADER SOCIETAL APPLICATIONS OF CARDS

The use of smart cards and debit cards to access services goes beyond
telecommunications, of course. The growth of card-based electronic
commerce has important implications for universal service policy. First,
access to telecommunications usage may become bundled with many other
transactions, which could have either positive or negative implications for
expanding telecommunications access. Second, cards could be used to
deliver government-sponsored universal service subsidies.
In Spain, approximately forty million smart cards are being issued to
replace paper documents covering pensions, social security payments,
employment, and health benefits.20 In the United States, twelve states were
operating programs to distribute food stamps and other government benefits
through smart cards in 1995. More than twenty are expected to be doing so
by 1997.21 Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) is expected to save
government money by reducing fraud and by automating accounting
processes. One interesting policy issue is whether Regulation E of the
19. USTA Warns Consumers of AT&T's Decision to Cancel Mutual Card Honoring
Agreements (visited Feb. 5, 1997) <http://www.usta.orgrls96-22.html>.
20. Paul Taylor & Tom Foremski, Smart Cards' Time Has Come, FIN. PosT, Oct. 26,
1996, at C20.
21. Richard Mitchell, Electronic Welfare's Big Year, CREDIT CARD MGMT., Mar. 1995,
at 16-17.
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federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act applies to EBT. Regulation E shields
bank customers from fraudulent use of ATM and credit cards by limiting
their liability to only fifty dollars. Banks must swallow the rest of the
loss.'
Regardless of the short-term fate of EBT, it is evident that smart cards
will eventually mediate a large part of our relationship to state governments
and other vital institutions. The state of New Jersey, for example, will soon
be testing a high-tech driver's license that can be used to pay tolls, do
banking, provide medical records, and even give authorities access to
fingerprints. The smart cards would contain data for a motorist's picture,
signature, and fingerprints, as well as an "electronic purse" that could be
used to pay for bus and train fares. The next phase would add vehicle
registration and allow the cards to be used on the New Jersey Turnpike,
Garden State Parkway, and Atlantic City Expressway.
A growing number of colleges and universities use debit cards for
tuition payments, long-distance phone calls, meal payments to school
cafeterias or outside vendors, and sporting events. The University of
Michigan at Ann Arbor has about 46,000 magnetic stripe cards in
circulation which can be used for identification, building access, ATM
transactions, campus events, and purchases at about sixty-five merchant
locations. The university's card program is part of an alliance with First of
America Bank. Only those with First of America accounts can use the cards
for ATM and merchant transactions; in return, the bank picked up the cost
of the merchant terminals, transaction network, and transaction processing.

Most of these existing debit cards have a limited, "closed-loop"
functionality. They are meant for a single type of transaction, like telephone
calls or a transit pass, or they can only be used at locations within a set
geographical boundary, such as a specific university or state. Some of the
major banks and credit card companies, in contrast, are attempting to create
stored value cards with an open system architecture that can be used as
widely as traditional printed cash or coins. Visa Cash, which debuted on a

large scale in the United States at the Atlanta Olympics, is one of the most

22. Local governments fear that if the $50 limit is applied to EBT, EBT cards and
access numbers will be traded for cash in an underground market, and the economic benefits
of EBT will be more than offset by losses to fraud. This position has the support of the
National Association of Counties, the National Governors Association, and the American
Public Welfare Association. But the Federal Reserve Board and the Consumers Union see
application of Regulation E to welfare as an equity issue; i.e., the same regulation should
apply to all members of the public regardless of whether they are on public assistance. Brian
Miller, Regulation E Threatens Welfare EBT (visited Feb. 5, 1997) <http://www.govtech.net/
1995/gt/jan/ebt.shtm>.
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important examples.2 3 The transactions processing firm, EDS, is attempting
to elevate the ATM cash machine into a "merchandising" device that can
sell a variety of products and services, such as prepaid phone cards, movie
or theatre tickets, travellers checks, postage stamps, and "Z-cash," EDS's
proprietary cash transfer service. 24
IV. UNIVERSAL SERVICE ISSUES
It is already possible to see, in embryonic form, the universal service
advantages and disadvantages of the new conditions. Cards have enormous
capabilities to overcome the restrictions on telecommunications access
created by the old technology's inextricable link between the physical
access line and the account relationship. Cards also expand access by
making it possible to configure the debit/credit relationship in creative ways,
allowing low-income end users to establish what is to the supplier a lowerrisk account relationship when they cannot establish a normal account
relationship. But the cards also raise a number of worrisome possibilities
about the distribution of risk, consumer lock-in, and service bundling.
A.

RECONFIGURING THE ECONOMICS OF ACCESS

In his comprehensive survey of theory and empirical research on
telecommunications demand, Lester Taylor observes that the demand for
telephone service consists of two distinct parts, access and usage. Usage
is conditional upon having purchased access to the system. Generally this
is reflected in a two-part tariff structure, which includes a monthly rental of
an access line (often bundled with local usage) and toll charges for usage.
The demand for access can be derived from the demand for usage. A person
will purchase access if the consumer surplus gained from the sum of all
telephone calls equals or exceeds the price of access.
Card-based access results in a dramatic reconfiguration of the
economics of telecommunications demand. We need to reconsider the
application of economic theory to third-generation conditions. Here are a
few indications of areas where work could be done:
1. The theory of the demand for access must include a more
systematic treatment of calculations of credit risk and deposit requirements.
23. Visa Chip-Based Stored Value Card Products Offer Cash Alternative to Consumers,
Visa Expo (visited Feb. 5, 1997) <http://www.visa.com/cgi-bin/vee/vw/news/PRelco032395.
html?2+0>.
24. Interview, EDS Electronic Commerce Division, in Morris Plains, New Jersey (Nov.
20, 1996).
25. LESTER D. TAYLOR, TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEMAND IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 910 (1994).
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For new subscribers, especially immigrant populations, advance deposits
make up a substantial part of the cost of purchasing traditional fixed-line
residential access. The economic analysis of the consumer surplus derived
from usage must be elaborated to take account of the fact that for many
populations, usage may exceed the budget constraint. In such cases, the
demand for usage comes to resemble the demand for consumer credit.
2. Users have "sunk costs" in purchasing traditional forms of access,
in the form of once-off installation and connection fees. These costs can be
significant in absolute terms for a low-income resident. Moreover, such
sunk costs increase as a proportion of total access expenditures, the shorter
the time the resident stays in one place. This is an important factor affecting
the demand for access among immigrant populations, renters, and younger,
less-stable households.
3. By eliminating billing costs and collection uncertainty, prepaid debit
cards substantially reduce the risk of telecommunications supply. But some
of this risk has simply been shifted to the demand side. End users can put
down good money for service that never materializes, due to billing disputes
between the card issuer and the underlying carrier, poor service by a card
issuer's network, lost or stolen cards, or card expiration.
4. The notion of call externality takes on a new significance in the age
of digital networks and card-based access. Thus far, cards only enhance the
ability to place outgoing calls. It is not inconceivable, however, that one
could prepay for the right to receive calls. Furthermore, with voice mail and
other message-storing capabilities of networks and terminal equipment,
users often "receive" calls by making outgoing calls. The ability to monitor
where incoming calls are coming from adds another dimension to the
problem. It would be nice to see economists revisit call externality in light
of these developments.
5. Increasingly, the digital network detaches the consumption of access
from the rental of a specific line. That is, users of credit and debit cards
gain the option to place calls regardless of whether they are in a location
where they have rented an access line or not. The account relationship
becomes portable.26 In terms of traditional telephone demand theory, this
situation is best described as an enhancement or extension of the principle
of the pay telephone. As is the case with payphones, cards enhance
outgoing capabilities but not the ability to receive calls. There is no
distinction between access and usage on the demand side; the two are
consumed together on what might be called a "spot" basis. Usage is not

26. But this is true for outgoing calls only. So far, card-based access has done little to
make the option to receive calls portable across facilities and networks.
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conditioned upon a prior payment for access (unless one considers the
purchase of the card itself as an access payment); rather, the telephone
company--or an intermediary such as a drug store-pays for access and
recovers the costs by making higher margins on usage. Unfortunately,
according to Taylor, "the [existing] literature on the demand for coin-station
service is small and unsystematic. 2 7 The conflation of access and usage
in payphone and card-based telecommunications has important implications
for universal service. It suggests the feasibility of alternative forms of
telecommunications access wherein access is priced at zero and costs are
recovered entirely through metered usage via debit cards. Such an
arrangement is closely related to the idea of "quick dial tone" but has the
added element of giving the telephone companies an incentive to maintain
open lines by turning the "warm line" into a potential (and relatively riskfree) revenue source. Such limited, metered access enables greater sharing
of access facilities by groups of people (since charges are made to cards and
not to the account holder of the line) and a wider range of mobility for
telecommunications users. This would enhance the affordability of access
for extremely poor and low-usage households.

B. PREPAID CARDS AND DISCONNECTION: EVIDENCE FROM THE
U.K.
Some striking evidence of the ability of a combination of debit cards
and a "quick dial tone" arrangement to reduce disconnection from essential
utilities has been collected by Howard Williams of Analysys.28 The
Analysys report looks at the use of debit cards in electric and water utilities
in the United Kingdom and other European countries.
In the electricity industry, customers who are in arrears are offered a
prepaid electricity meter. The prepaid meters are controlled by smart cards
that can have credits loaded onto them in post offices, electricity company
shops, and other outlets. The system is programmed not to disrupt service
if the credits run out during the night or weekend times, when it is
impossible to add credits to the card. Instead, it allows the subscriber to
accumulate a small debt, which is recouped the next time the card is loaded
with credits. When a customer has accumulated debts, the smart card can
be calibrated to charge a higher amount of money per unit of electricity
than for normal prepayment.

27. TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 332.
28. The Future of Universal Service in European Telecoms: Provision of Public
Telecoms Services in the Context of ONP, Draft Final Report for EC DGXIII/AI, Analysys
Report No. 96215 (Aug. 2, 1996).
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Since the introduction of this system in 1991, the rate of disconnection
of electricity customers in the U.K. has fallen from nearly 13,000 per year
in 1992-93 to 1084 in 1994-95.29 A similar scheme was introduced for
water utilities in the financial year 1991-92. Residential customer water
disconnections in England and Wales fell from 21,282 in the 1991-92
financial year to 5286 in the 1995-96 financial year.30 Evidently, a society
which is willing to reconfigure the account relationship between low-income
users and utilities will be rewarded with major reductions in disconnection.
V. CONCLUSION
The intersection of universal service policy with electronic commerce
is well underway. Although the drafters of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act were blind to this convergence, it is not too late for the FCC to look
ahead. We can identify the following as the primary areas which require
additional analysis:
Distributionof Risk. For the supplier, debit cards substantially reduce
payment risk and billing and collection costs, because they are based on
prepayment rather than credit. There is solid empirical evidence that use of
debit cards can reduce disconnection from utilities because of this. But these
examples were taken from a monopoly utility environment. In the highly
competitive and fragmented U.S. telecommunications marketplace,
prepayment shifts some of the risk to the consumer. Users can buy cards
that don't work. Cards can expire, be lost, or be stolen. Users will face
uncertainties about how and when their cards can be used, and in some
cases suppliers may exploit this ignorance to extract supernormal profits on
use. In part, this is simply a function of the newness of the market. But the
need to protect consumers from such abuses raises significant regulatory
issues which need to be addressed at the state and federal levels.
As card-based forms of electronic commerce permeate the economy,
the issue of liability for fraud, now addressed by Regulation E, will
probably have to be revisited. This problem, of course, transcends
telecommunications policy.
Problems of Subsidizing Usage vs. Access. The natural extension of
card-based access and EBT is to use cards to distribute usage subsidies to
the needy. Most economists would agree that giving the subsidy to users
who could not otherwise afford telecommunications makes more sense than
delivering subsidies through the supplier. Supplier subsidies are not targeted
at the needy but apply to anyone and everyone. They undermine efficient

29. Id. at 59.

30. Id. at 61.
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pricing of services. They also necessitate endless wrangles over the costs
incurred by assuming a universal service obligation and the degree to which
subsidies can be ported from one supplier to another. It is highly unfortunate that the 1996 Act, steeped as it is in the principles of secondgeneration universal service policy, commits the United States to supplyside subsidies.
On the other hand, the notion of subsidizing usage has some problems
of its own. Despite the fact that most users drop off the network because of
usage costs and not access costs, access subsidies fit liberal notions of
equality of opportunity much more comfortably than usage subsidies. With
a subsidy to access, the government is saying to the beneficiary: "Now you
have (roughly) the same opportunity to communicate by telephone as
everyone else. If you choose to use this opportunity heavily, you will have
to pay for it. You may use the phone wisely or foolishly, but at least you
have access to emergency services, schools, and job opportunities."
Subsidies to usage, on the other hand, give the subsidized party a lot
more discretion. The government has little control over how the subsidized
phone credits are used. Some recipients will no doubt fritter away their
usage credits on unnecessary long-distance calls, 900 number services, etc.
Others will carefully husband the resource. Unless the government gets into
the business of monitoring communications, an alternative few citizens
would find attractive, it will have to accept this fact.
Universal Interoperability.In the short term, telecom card users are
likely to be confronted with a wide variety of card networks with a broad
range of interoperability levels and different access modes. Card networks
will overlap and compete in complicated ways. The situation is similar to
the fragmentation which led to the first generation of universal service
policy. Universal interoperability of card-based access methods would make
life simpler for the consumer and might appear to reduce their risk of being
locked into high-priced services. We must be careful, however, to balance
the need for universal compatibility with the need for vigorous competition.
The first-generation universal service policy was too willing to sacrifice
system rivalry to achieve universal interconnection. It pinned its hopes on
regulatory commissions, thinking that they could provide an adequate
substitute for the price and service incentives of a competitive marketplace.
We know now that regulation of market entry, exit, and interconnection can
result in higher costs and lower innovation over the long term. We know
now that eliminating the compatibility differences between networks can be
tantamount to the elimination of competition between them. Policymakers
must therefore tolerate, to some degree, strategic behavior by card-based
networks that is designed to differentiate products and services. The trick

Number 3)

TIRD-GENERATION UNIVERSAL SERVICE

673

is to know when and where to draw the line. Regulators cannot rule out all
tying and bundling behavior as prima facie anticompetitive or anticonsumer,
even though it may in fact inconvenience consumers compared to a standard
of perfect competition. Tying and bundling, after all, is what networks are
all about. Any attempt to eliminate them altogether is bound to lead back
to regulated monopoly.

